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GENERAL LUCIUS D. CLAY

A CASE STUDY OF STRATEGIC LEADERSHIP AND VISION

BY

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
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intellectual activity. To envision what the future can and should be and to create conditions for a vision to become reality, a strategic leader must rely on highly developed frames of reference formed by a variety of demanding, diverse experiences. Like General Clay, future strategic leaders must have the potential for such intellectual activity and have that potential developed through a series of demanding and stretching experiences. This study suggests that the Army needs to revise and publish a coherent framework for its leadership doctrine and review its policies which impact on the development of strategic leaders.

USAWC MILITARY STUDIES PROGRAM PAPER

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GENERAL LUCIUS D. CLAY

A CASE STUDY OF STRATEGIC LEADERSHIP AND VISION

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

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ABSTRACT

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This project is a study of strategic leadership and vision focused on the superb career of General Lucius D. Clay, a leader whose capabilities and contributions have been overlooked in the Army's current examination of strategic leadership. Turning to Clay's example is timely, as the true impact of his leadership and strategic vision as the first military governor of Germany and the first CINCEUR are finally being realized today with the German reunification and the end of the Cold War. General Clay had a unique career, and the path he took would be considered completely non-standard by today's measures. He had no advanced civil or military education and had virtually no time with or command of tactical units: two major discriminators for advancement in the officer corps of the 1990s. Fortunately, General Clay served in a series of extremely demanding and developmental positions that prepared him to create and implement a strategic vision and to lead the effort to establish post-war Germany. A review of military and non-military literature suggests that the nature of work at the strategic leadership level requires the capability for complex intellectual activity. To envision what the future can and should be and to create conditions for a vision to become reality, a strategic leader must rely on highly developed frames of reference formed by a variety of demanding, diverse experiences. Like General Clay, future strategic leaders must have the potential for such intellectual activity and have that potential developed through a series of demanding and stretching experiences. This study suggests that the Army needs to revise and publish a coherent framework for its leadership doctrine and review its policies which impact on the development of strategic leaders.

Introduction

Strategic Vision is a special theme for study at the United States Army War College (USAWC) for academic year 1990-91. In response to that challenge, this study will strive to discern lessons from the example of General Lucius D. Clay about this nebulous, but desired, strategic leader competency. General Clay was responsible for the U.S. military government of Germany from 1945 to 1949, and he became the first CINCEUR with the Defense Reorganization in 1947. His vision and his actions began a process which transformed Germany from the ashes of World War II to the startling reunification of 1990.

Since the Vietnam War military leadership has been the topic of innumerable studies and articles. The United States Army War College study Leadership in the 1970's began this period of serious introspection. It was followed in the 1980's by The Professional Development of Officers Study. The trend is not unparalleled; the years after the tragedy of World War I were marked by the writings of an unprecedented number of brilliant men who attempted to interpret the lessons learned, many of which focused on leadership. One of these thinkers of the inter-war years, J.F.C. Fuller, has been paraphrased in Field Manual 100-5, Operations, in his often stated dictate that leadership is the most powerful of the four dynamics of combat power. Leadership, the manual states,

provides purpose, direction, and motivation in combat. It is the leader who will determine the degree to which maneuver, firepower, and protection are maximized...There are no ready formulas to govern the process...Only excellence in the art and science of war...no peacetime duty is more important for leaders than studying their profession and preparing for war. The regular study of military history and biography is invaluable in this regard. (emphasis added) [1]

It is in that spirit that this study of General Lucius D. Clay has been undertaken. However, it will not reexamine battlefield leadership but will focus on aspects of leadership at the highest levels. It will look at the strategic leader who must act, assist, and advise in the effort to maximize the elements of national power, vice the efforts of his subordinate leaders who work to maximize combat power.

Over the last decade the Army has not only revamped its basic leadership doctrine, reflected in FM 22-100, Military Leadership, but has also added previously unaddressed dimensions to its loosely structured doctrinal framework for military leadership: those of senior and strategic leadership. In 1987 the Army published a new field manual and a pamphlet which address themselves solely to the topic of leadership and command at these levels. Field Manual (FM) 22-103, Leadership and Command at Senior Levels, is written within the context of FM 100-5, Operations, and thus its focus appears to be on senior leader requirements at the tactical and operational, not strategic, levels. Therefore, it does not specifically address the leadership requirements for the most senior military officers, four-star generals. Department of the Army Pamphlet 600-80, Executive Leadership, does focus on leadership at the executive, or strategic (3-4 star), level. Both documents address the concept of vision as a necessary competency for leader success at top levels. While neither provides a clear idea about how it is developed, DA Pam 600-80 introduces the concept of "frames of reference" or "cognitive mapping." Over time, leaders translate experiences of all kinds into increasingly complex mental maps which not only heighten their ability to understand abstract and complicated relationships but also enhance

their abilities to envision desirable and possible futures.

Interestingly, efforts to examine senior leadership and to determine the importance of vision in the leadership and management practices at the executive levels of the private sector parallel this Army concern.

This study will review military and non-military literature in order to suggest a workable definition for strategic vision. It will review the rich and unique career of General Clay in an attempt to determine what his vision was, how he implemented it, and how he developed the ability or capacity to envision at a strategic level. Lastly, the study will suggest direction for the Army's continuing efforts to understand this strategic leadership competency.

The sudden end of the Cold War and the surprising war in the Middle East mark this as an era of chaos, conflict, and transition; it is a period of great opportunity for leaders with vision. As the world witnesses the reunification of Germany, it is fitting to examine General Clay's largely forgotten contributions and leadership abilities, especially his vision, and to draw lessons for future strategic leaders.

Part I
Literature Review
Strategic Leadership

It seems useful from the beginning to gain some precision in terminology. Recent publications use the terms senior, executive, systems, and strategic leadership somewhat synonymously. DA Pam 600-80 describes three levels of leadership that are different because of the nature of the tasks or demands on the leader: direct, indirect-organizational, and indirect-executive. This suggests two major modes of leadership, direct and indirect, divided into three distinguishable levels. Unfortunately, these terms are not consistent with other U.S. Army or civilian publications, contributing to the confusion. This paper will label the three levels of leadership as direct, senior, and strategic.

Direct leadership is that described in FM 22-100 and exercised generally at battalion and lower levels. Direct leadership tasks heavily involve face-to-face influence of subordinates: coaching, teaching, directing, and motivating. Authority relationships are clear, simple, and direct; lateral relationships are focused on coordination.

Senior leadership, described in DA Pam 600-80 as "indirect-organizational" and addressed in FM 22-103, is that leadership required of officers commanding brigades up to those general officers in positions as high as corps commanders. At this level the leader has less direct control and influence over subordinates. Work involves a greater amount of staff assistance and delegation. Leader tasks include integrating and coordinating staff

functions, building teamwork among subordinate organizations, creating combat power or productivity through task organizing/integrating, and developing both subordinate leaders and command climate.

Strategic leadership, called executive leadership in DA Pam 600-80, is that leadership demanded of military and civilians at the top of the military structure or in unique positions, normally four-star equivalents. Strategic leaders, while expert in the capabilities of their own complex organizations, are primarily focused on external environments, on how their organizations interact with other complex systems. Strategic military leaders must understand and advise senior political leaders about the application of military power in light of the entire spectrum of national power (military, economic, political, and psycho-social). Leader tasks include establishing organizational values and culture, creating or tailoring organizations to meet future requirements, building consensus, and interacting/influencing other top leaders from other services, other nations, and other sectors of the government.

There is additional confusion at times over the differences between a strategic leadership position, a strategic leader, and strategic leadership. Strategic leadership is a process; a strategic leader is one capable of performing strategic leadership. A strategic leadership position (and the rank that goes with it) is one which demands strategic leadership of the incumbent. One is not a strategic leader merely because of rank or assignment to a strategic leadership position, and, conversely, one can be capable of strategic leadership regardless of current duty assignment.

An example can be seen in the career of General Colin Powell. As the V (US) Corps commander he held a senior, but not strategic,

leadership position. Despite its complexity, the job primarily required General Powell to focus on the corps and its interface with local organizations and activities. However, it is possible that General Powell had the capacity to act like a strategic leader and that he exercised strategic leadership in response to the numerous, non-job related demands placed upon him (calls for strategic advice, etc.). When he became the deputy to, and later, the national security advisor to the President, he moved into the strategic realm, while remaining a three-star general. His subsequent promotion and assignments as Commander, Forces Command and then Chairman, JCS clearly put him in the strategic leadership arena.

Strategic Leader Competencies

What are the attributes that a strategic leader must possess to succeed at that level? Our overarching leadership doctrine is couched in terms of what a leader must Be, know, and Do. In other words, he must possess certain attributes of character, he must have some critical aspects of knowledge, and he must possess certain skills and abilities. Character traits (courage, honesty, determination, compassion, etc.) are part of the make up of the leader and, for purposes of this study, will be considered as relatively equal in importance at all levels of leadership. In terms of knowledge, skills, and abilities, however, all the literature appears to be in agreement that the relative nature and importance of these change as one moves from direct, to senior, and then to strategic leadership.

There are as many lists of strategic leader competencies as there are theorists, writers, and practitioners. It is beyond the scope of this study to repeat or debate the differences, consistencies or relative correctness of these lists. DA Pam 600-80 describes three

general categories of leader competencies: technical, interpersonal (communications), and conceptual. While interpersonal skills are described as different but of relatively equal importance at all levels, the predominant requirements shift from technical to conceptual as one moves up from direct to strategic leadership.

DM Pam 500-30 stresses that this increased emphasis on conceptual skills is due to the increasing complexity of leader tasks at higher levels of organizations. As leaders ascend through the levels of a bureaucracy they gain in knowledge and experience, which provide opportunities for developing more complex frames of reference or mental maps. At the strategic level the leader's frames of reference or mental maps must be developed enough to deal with the most complex issues and to employ the most sophisticated cognitive processes. They must not only be able to understand complex situations but also be able to design organizations and systems that reduce complexity and bring order out of chaos making the resultant work more understandable and accomplishable by subordinates. They must be able to anticipate the second and third order effects of actions and events. They must be able to work with a future orientation and develop an array of future possibilities. After determining which possible future state is most desirable, they must employ proactive reasoning to influence the environment and direct the flow of events toward the envisioned future. Strategic leaders deal in the abstract, they create, they synthesize, they envision, and they attempt to shape the future. It is this idea that a leader must be able to work well into the future that has given rise to the new hot topic of leadership discussions: strategic vision.[3]

Strategic Vision

A review of the military and non-military literature on the subject of strategic vision as a necessary competency for strategic leaders reveals that the topic is not entirely a new one. In the 1930s, in his writings on the strategic leader, Clausewitz opined that success requires "appropriate gifts of intellect and temperament." [4] Clausewitz states that what the strategic leader "requires in the way of higher intellectual gifts is a sense of unity and power of judgment raised to a marvelous pitch of vision..." [5] He goes on to write that great intellectual capabilities alone cannot define great leadership without the attributes of character and temperament. Perhaps the use of the term vision in the context of what leaders must do is not new and may be tied to the renaissance of the study of Clausewitz.

The first mention of vision in our leadership doctrine appeared in 1987 with the nearly simultaneous publication of FM 22-103 and DA Pam 600-80. The manual dedicates an entire chapter, "Leadership Vision," to discussing the concept. It portrays a senior leadership model as a wheel, the hub of which is the leader's vision, described as his "personal concept of what the organization must be capable of doing by some future point." [6] Vision is further described in Clausewitzian terms as the source of the senior leader's effectiveness, his inner light. The manual asserts that leaders must possess certain attributes and perspectives, and adhere to specific imperatives to form their vision. Once it is formed, they must implement their vision. Unfortunately, the chapter is without examples and leaves the reader with many questions. The descriptions of the attributes, perspectives, and imperatives upon which the leader reportedly relies to make sense out of chaos and form a vision are not

coherently connected and leave the reader confused. The chapter gives no hints about how far into the future leaders must operate.

DA Pam 600-80 states that strategic leaders must project into the future sufficiently to envision major system-wide programs and the time required for their implementation. The pamphlet specifically uses future time frames to differentiate between the three leadership levels discussed earlier. At the direct level the demands and the leader requirements are described as ranging from days to several years. At the senior level the range is defined to be from five to ten years. At the strategic level the time span is cited as well beyond ten years.[7] As examples, the pamphlet refers to the twelve year horizon of the Army's Extended Planning Annex and the 20-25 year horizon of the ongoing modernization program. The modernization program "was not formulated in response to a requirement. Rather it was envisioned as a necessary step to create a force that could deal with likely future contingencies." [8]

As retired LTG Walter F. Ulmer, Jr., President of the Center for Creative Leadership, has critiqued, DA Pamphlet 600-80 is "a competent, although sometimes challenging text that adds significantly to our ongoing dialogue on senior leadership. It is businesslike and explanatory...Its themes are more complex and conceptual... [than FM 22-103]." He is critical, however, of the use of time frames as a discriminator between levels calling them "overdone." [9]

Overdone as the topic may be, it is obvious that all leaders must look to the future and that strategic leaders must look further into the future than their subordinates. Time frames are conditional, varying with the nature of the activity upon which the vision is focused. In combat situations, for example, the strategic leader may

envision desired future states toward which his organization can work that are only a few months away. He may simultaneously be envisioning force readiness, modernization, and organizational structure issues for the organization that reach out ten to fifteen years. Strategic leaders involved with Operation DESERT STORM and with the future size and structure of the armed forces are current examples of this multiple vision and time frame reality.

View from the Private Sector

Leadership vision is an increasingly common topic in the currently popular array of books and articles on management and leadership. Most authors tend to discuss vision in terms of its value to the internal organization. The clear emphasis is on the leader developing and communicating a vision that has a compelling, enabling, empowering, and inspiring effect on the people within the organization.

Tom Peters, author of the bestseller, In Pursuit of Excellence, is clearly representative of this group of popular theorists on top level management and leadership. In his most recent book, Thriving on Chaos, he stresses the need for vision stating "no leadership topic is more important." [10] He enumerates a laundry list of characteristics of a successful vision (inspiring, clear, challenging, makes sense, flexible, etc) and stresses that a correct and clearly communicated vision is the leader's best tool for orienting and energizing the members of an organization. The clear emphasis is on defining the vision and "preaching" or selling it to subordinates.

In The Leadership Challenge, Kouzes and Posner give some hints as to the source of a leader's vision. "Intuition is the wellspring of vision." [11] They state that intuition is the product of knowledge

and experience: the leader's frames of reference. "Visions are reflections of our fundamental beliefs and assumptions about human nature, technology, economics, science, politics, arts, and ethics." [12] This seems to indicate that they believe vision is the product of a complex cognitive process that considers the entire broad array of a leader's knowledge, values, instincts, intuitions, and experiences.

The noted author on leadership, John W. Gardner, in his 1990 book On Leadership, also recognizes the intellectual complexity of the envisioning process in his broad definition.

Of the popularly expressed requirements for leadership, one of the most common is that leaders have vision, which can mean a variety of things: that they think longer-term; that they see where their system fits in a larger context; that they can describe the outlines of a possible future that lifts and moves people; or that they actually discern, in the clutter and confusion of the present, the elements that determine what is to come. [13]

In his article, "Futures-Creative Leadership," Bert Nanus presents a view of vision that counters the internally focused view of the popular authors. He criticizes current leadership for preoccupation with internal and present concerns. He warns that traditional leader roles that focus on organizational goal setting and relationships between leaders and followers (direct or personal leadership) are not sufficient at the senior leadership levels. Top leadership must attend primarily to the external environment and to possible future situations. To do this Nanus asserts that leaders must be intellectually equipped to "form mental images of the future and to translate these images into reality through leadership and action." [14] These leader actions involve processes: the dynamics within organizations and between organizations and the external

environment; and structure: the necessary organizational design for success in the envisioned future environment. Nanus argues that leaders must understand the past and the present (frames of reference) in order to take actions that will create or shape the desired future.

Nanus also co-authored with Warren Bennis a book entitled Leaders, the Strategies for Taking Charge, one of the most readable and logical treatments of leadership vision. They studied the leader behaviors of ninety of the most effective, successful senior leaders in the nation, sixty from corporations and thirty from the public sector. They observed that successful chief executives are concerned with vision, with determining a desired future state for their organizations. The vision must be compelling and communicated to the organization. This inspiring and empowering vision is imperative to the "management of attention" in organizations: it creates goals and boundaries in which the productive energies and creativity of subordinates can work in alignment, on track, and in focus.[15] To Bennis and Nanus vision is a bridge, a leadership tool to take an organization from the present to the future. To create this vision,

a leader must first have developed a mental image of a possible and desired future state of the organization. This image, which we will call a vision, may be as vague as a dream or as precise as a goal or mission statement. The critical point is that a vision articulates a view of a realistic, credible, attractive future for the organization, a condition that is better in some important ways than what now exists.[16]

They conclude their analysis of the leader's intellectual processes of visioning in Clausewitzian terms.

If there is a spark of genius in the leadership function at all, it must lie in this transcending ability, a kind of magic, to assemble - out of all the variety of images, signals, forecasts and alternatives - a clearly articulated vision of the future that is at once simple, easily understood, clearly desirable, and energizing.[17]

Warren Bennis sums his thoughts on vision when he wrote, "A successful vision or intention is simple, complete, and unified. It contains within it all the information needed to be workable and to deliver goods. It can be communicated and its expression can take the organization into the unknown." [18]

All theorists seem to agree that it is important for senior leaders to create and communicate a vision. This vision must provide direction and inspiration for the organization. Most suggest that the ability to envision is a complex mental process of synthesizing our values, knowledge, and experiences.

As a result of this literature review, strategic vision may be defined as a product of the strategic leader's intellectual and conceptual capabilities which clearly and simply states what the desired future can and should be. It is based in the leader's broad and complex frames of reference which are formed by values, education, and experience. To have utility, this vision must be communicated to the organization to focus and empower subordinates as they work toward this intended future state, and it must be communicated externally in order to shape the environment in a manner that permits the desired end state to be realized.

The close examination of the illustrative career of General Lucius D. Clay, whose vision of 1945 is finally being realized today, will provide a model for testing this working definition.

Part II

Lucius D. Clay-

An Extraordinary Public Servant[19]

President Franklin Roosevelt's aide Harry Hopkins once remarked that it was a miracle that the United States, which had neglected its Army almost completely in the interwar years, was blessed with so large and so brilliant a group of World War II military leaders, able to deal with complex and unique problems that were as much political as military. Among those career soldiers to whom Hopkins referred few if any surpassed General Lucius D. Clay.[20]

Lucius Clay was born in 1898 in Georgia, the youngest of six children of the junior U.S. Senator from that state. The Clay family had farmed, without slaves, the rocky fields of northern Georgia since the 1850's. Despite their humble origins the Clays were of traditional southern aristocratic stock. Lucius' great-great grandfather had been the brother of Senator Henry Clay of Kentucky, the Great Compromiser, who worked so hard to avert the American Civil War. After growing up on the farm during the Reconstruction, Clay's father became a small town lawyer, a fierce Democrat, and a U.S. Senator who died when Lucius was twelve.

Lucius Clay experienced an early life of transition, living alternately in Washington and Marietta. While he was briefly a Senate page, he remembered Washington most for the Library of Congress. As the youngest he was virtually an only child and filled the hours alone reading. Clay developed an early sense of independence, an inquisitive mind, and a knack for self-development.

Clay entered the United States Military Academy in 1915. His three years there (his class graduated early because of World War I)

proved to be the last formal education he would receive. He found academics easy but the petty rigmarole of cadet life almost unbearable. He finished first in his class in English and history, twenty-seventh of 137 overall. He finished a cadet private, 128th in conduct; four more demerits and he would not have graduated. At graduation, he was commissioned a second lieutenant of artillery but was transferred involuntarily to the Corps of Engineers during his three week graduation leave.

Clay's first eleven years as a lieutenant were lackluster. He attended the equivalent of the basic course at the Engineer School of Application and spent the balance of his time as a post staff officer or instructor, including a tour with the new ROTC program at Auburn and one as an instructor of civil engineering at West Point.

In 1929, upon completion of the engineer advanced course, the last military school he would attend, he was assigned to 11th Engineers in Panama. During his two years there Clay did extensive mapping and served as a company commander. This was Clay's last assignment to a tactical (or TO&E) unit and his last command until he became CINCEUR in 1947.

He returned to the United States and became an assistant district engineer in Pittsburgh, responsible for the construction of lock and dam number 2 on the Allegheny River. Unlike the majority of soldiers isolated in western forts or overseas, Clay saw firsthand and was touched by depression conditions in Pittsburgh. Like many professional soldiers, Clay followed the election of Roosevelt in 1932 with great, but detached, interest (traditionally soldiers were publicly apolitical and rarely voted).

In 1933, Clay's career took a decisive shift when he was selected

for assignment to the rivers and harbors section of the Washington office of the Corps of Engineers. After fifteen years as a lieutenant he was finally at the top of the seniority list and was promoted to captain. In this position he coordinated all the Corps waterway projects which caused him to deal directly with Congress. He also became involved in the Corps of Engineer efforts in fulfillment of several New Deal programs during which he worked closely with such men as Harry Hopkins. Indeed, during the four years he worked in Washington, Clay grew to understand how the government operated. He developed rapport and a superb reputation with the most influential people in government.

In 1937, Captain Clay departed Washington for service in the Phillipines as a staff engineer on MacArthur's staff. His primary duties included assisting in the formation of the Phillipine Army Corps of Engineers and a substantial survey to determine the island's potential for hydroelectric power. His most important accomplishment may have been the close, social and professional relationship he developed with Eisenhower, MacArthur's chief of staff.

When the Denison, Texas Red River Dam project was approved by Congress, Clay was recalled to be its chief engineer and project officer. This monumental task offered Clay the rare opportunity to operate on his own. The Denison Dam was a massive undertaking and Clay was up to the challenge of engineering the structure and initiating the construction. It solidified his reputation as a practical engineer and manager. As war raged in Europe, this reputation contributed to his recall to Washington to head the emergency airport construction program for the Civil Aeronautics Administration in 1940.

In his three year absence from Washington, Clay had not forgotten how to get things done. While there were only 36 major airports in America when he started, he had 457 new or enlargement projects under way in nine months, including airports in such strategic places as Alaska, Midway, and several other islands of the Pacific that would play an important role in World War II. His biographer stated, "Officially, Clay became secretary of the Airport Approval Board and assistant to the Administrator of Civil Aeronautics. The board had three members [all cabinet members]...But the board never met, and for practical purposes Clay ran the program." [21]

When the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor jolted the nation into war, Clay was again eager for assignment with troops. Instead, he was assigned to lead a mission to Brazil and successfully secured permission for airport construction and use by military aircraft transiting to Europe. Upon return, he was initially told he would get his wish for an overseas troop assignment as Stilwell's chief engineer in China. As he was preparing to depart General Marshall announced the reorganization of the War Department and the creation of the Services of Supply. Clay became the Chief of Materiel within this new directorate that was responsible for all supply and services within the army and air forces. His rapid advance from captain in 1940 to the youngest brigadier general in 1942 did little to ameliorate Clay's disappointment with a wartime assignment in Washington.

As Chief of Materiel Clay supervised all War Department procurement for what would become an eight million man army. He established priorities, helped jump-start industry, allocated scarce resources, negotiated contracts, monitored production schedules, initiated research and development programs, coordinated Lend-Lease,

and disposed of surplus property - all without a hint of scandal. His first task had been to develop a coordinated program of procurement for a force of undetermined size, with an undefined mission.

It took all of Clay's talents to manage the procurement of materiel for the army and air forces. His mission was to "find out what the Army needs and get it." [22] Because the size, structure, and operational imperatives for these forces were still being developed he had to order materiel ahead of force structure decisions. He often found himself at odds with the War Production Board first over priorities, later over the extent of civilian control of procurement, and lastly over the schedule to reconvert industry to civilian consumer goods. Clay foresaw the need to insist on contract renegotiation rights on all procurement programs and eventually won that battle in the Supreme Court when challenged by industry. Clay had the unique ability to see and to cause order out of chaos.

Throughout the war General Marshall continued to deny his requests to go to war. As Secretary of the Treasury Morgenthau stated, "the most able fellow around this town is General Clay." [23] Clay had become

the linchpin of America's military production. He was too important...to allow the War Department to gratify his personal desire for combat. Equally important, Clay served as a valuable lightning rod on Capitol Hill...He could be relied upon...to protect that important flank while Stimson and Marshall got on with fighting the war. [24]

Finally, after D-Day, Clay was sent to France at General Eisenhower's request to replace General Lee as the chief of supply for Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces (SHAEF). When Clay arrived Eisenhower had had second thoughts about relieving Lee and used Clay as a troubleshooter. SHAEF's most pressing problem was

getting supplies onto the continent. Clay was put in charge of the Normandy Base. Within days he vastly increased the flow through Cherbourg and reorganized the entire base of operations. His next task was to assess the materiel needs of the force. Severe ammunition shortages were projected and Clay was sent to the States to present the figures to Marshall. While Clay was in Washington, the Germans launched the attack through the Ardennes, the most sobering impact of which was the realization that the war was perhaps far from over. Clay was not allowed to return to the theater, despite Eisenhower's protest. Instead he was made the deputy for the Office of War Mobilization which included the War Production Board and controlled all industrial production during the war.

Arguably, Clay had become the third most powerful man in the war on the homefront. Clay's boss was the Director of War Mobilization, former Senator and Supreme Court Justice, James F. Byrnes, who had been dubbed "FDR's assistant president on the homefront." [25] His powers had just been increased as Congress gave his office the statutory authority for the reconversion of industry as well. Byrnes had enormous confidence in Clay and left him in charge without detailed instructions during his long absences from Washington for activities such as the Yalta conference. In this capacity Clay faced numerous tough issues, some of which pitted him, as a presidential appointee, against the position held by the War Department. For example, he opposed the national service legislation, a bill strongly favored by the Secretary of War, that would have provided for drafting men into a variety of critical defense industries. Examples of the broad reaching powers he exercised were his instructions which caused the closing of racetracks and the midnight closing of all nightclubs

as signals to the people of America that rationing and the critical needs for labor were real.

As Germany's fate seemed certain in the early spring of 1945, Roosevelt and his advisors discussed how Germany should be governed during the occupation. Indeed, there had been much discussion, and significant division, between representatives of State, War, and Treasury about the policy to govern the occupation. JCS directive 1067 was the compromise solution. After several civilians were considered for the position Roosevelt decided to keep the occupation in military hands, reporting through the War Department. Eisenhower asked for Clay to become his deputy for military government; Roosevelt approved. Clay's selection reflected his reputation as a politically sensitive general who was on intimate terms with all the figures in the Roosevelt administration. He had legendary organizational ability, and as John Kenneth Galbraith stated, Clay was "one of the most skillful politicians ever to wear the uniform of the United States Army." [26]

The American press reacted with great support when Roosevelt announced that Clay would be in charge of the military government of Germany. As Clay had been tough on the homefront, many assumed he would rule with an iron fist and put the Germans in their place. The Washington Post, which had often criticized Clay for his insistence that civilian consumption be curtailed, said that "General Clay's exceedingly high abilities are better suited to the German situation than our own. That task calls for authoritarianism." [27] The New York Herald Tribune wrote that "life will be hard for the German citizen ... but things may be a little easier for the American." [28]

Clay faced an environment in Europe was unprecedented in its

complexity. No satisfactory military government structure or staff existed to handle the multitude of non-military functions for which Clay was responsible. There was little written guidance on how Germany was to be governed. Germany was in total chaos with millions of displaced people and severe shortages of housing, clothing, and food. Civil government did not exist at any level. Unlike MacArthur, who became sole ruler in Japan, Clay had the additional challenges that came with coalitions. Under the quadripartite rule shaped during wartime conferences, Clay was responsible for only the U.S. zone and had to coordinate all actions with the British, Soviets, and French.

Clay's first challenge was typical of most that he would face in his four years in Europe: he had to fight with elements of his own government in order to implement innovative solutions to complicated problems. While the U.S. Army had some experience in operating military governments in the Phillipines, Puerto Rico, and Cuba, it was basically unprepared for the scope of the requirements for long-term occupation in post-war Europe. Clay insisted on establishing military government as a separate organization, autonomous from the tactical command. Roosevelt had decided to leave the occupation in the hands of the War Department, not State. Clay understood that this was primarily due to the military's unique abilities in the face of the disaster that was Europe, and the absolute requirement for unity of effort under the theater commander, Eisenhower. He also understood that the occupation was primarily a political, not a military, matter. He convinced General Eisenhower to make him a deputy for military government reporting only to him and with freedom to communicate with the Secretary of War. This upset Ike's Chief of Staff, LTG Bedell Smith, who thought Clay should have merely been the SHAEF G-5. LTG

Smith became the deputy for military matters. Clay had to continually battle with the tactical staff to properly operate the occupation government until he became CINCEUR in 1947.

Clay called upon numerous men from outside the professional military who were serving in the Army or in government during World War II to build his organization. They came from academia, industry, Wall Street, and other parts of the government. In the four years that followed, they had to handle a wide range of non-military tasks: land reform, currency reform, war crimes trials, rebuilding Germany's agriculture and industry, reestablishing the education system, denazification, war reparations, and much more. Their crowning task was the establishment of a democratic German government.

Clay's charter for governing Germany was JCS Directive 1067, a harsh, punitive set of instructions. Clay tried to have it changed, but the mood of the American people and politicians was one of retribution. The best he could get was Secretary Stimson's advice to not interpret it too rigidly or narrowly. Clay assumed a substantial amount of flexibility and autonomy in accomplishing his mission.

His frustrations in governing the U.S. zone were aggravated by the lack of agreement and cooperation between the Allies. Common policies were to be applied to all Germans under the quadripartite system, but in the absence of agreement each zonal governor had complete authority in his zone. Clay worked hard to maintain the four power rule as a means of keeping Germany united. Generally, he and his British counterpart were able to agree or to compromise. The Soviets were initially cooperative and their demands were reasonable considering the terrible costs they had suffered at the hands of the Germans in the war. The French were less than cooperative and

actively sought to have Germany stripped of industry and territory. The French found their greatest allies in a pro-French, pro-British U.S. State Department. While Clay and his State Department advisor, Robert Murphy, got along well, the career diplomats at the State Department seemed to make Clay's job more difficult. As the French, and eventually the Soviets, became obtrusive to the process of governing Germany as a single unit, Clay forged an agreement to merge the British and U.S. zones into a bizonal arrangement.

Clay was convinced that a strongly democratic Germany must be created in strategic central Europe. His view was not widely shared. The French wanted to separate the Ruhr and the Rhineland from Germany and to annex Saarland. The Soviets began establishing communist governments in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and in their zone of Germany. Relations between the western allies and the USSR began to seriously deteriorate throughout 1946-47 and reached its nadir in 1948 as Clay initiated currency reform in the three western zones and allied sectors of Berlin. This precipitated the Berlin Blockade.

While most Washington officials thought that Berlin had to be surrendered to the Soviets as untenable, Clay saw the Soviet move as power politics that could be dealt with short of war. He was convinced that if western allies gave up Berlin, our efforts to maintain a free, democratic Germany, and Europe, would be dealt a severe blow. He initiated the Berlin airlift on his own order and reassured President Truman that Berlin could be supplied indefinitely given the aircraft. His strong request for permission to force the land route to Berlin was supported by the allies but not by Washington. Nevertheless, the airlift became the symbol of American commitment to the security and freedom of all of Europe. It was

Clay's conviction that if the U.S. had backed down from the Soviets the Marshall Plan would not have become a reality and NATO would never have been formed.[29]

As Berlin galvanized the western allies, Clay was able to press the issue of establishing a West German state. He presided over the formulation of the German Basic Law. On May 12, 1949, two significant events transpired. The Soviets lifted the blockade and the Basic Law was accepted by the western allies. The establishment of the Federal Republic of Germany was his crowning achievement. In that same month, at the height of his success, General Clay retired from active military service.

After the hero's welcome home, the employment offers rolled in. Clay absolutely refused to work for any company with government contracts. He started working for a small paper company in North Carolina but resigned when it was purchased by Olin Corporation, a major defense contractor. Soon, he accepted the position of Chief Executive Officer for Continental Can Company. In the eleven years he spent with the company it grew into a market-leading, diversified, billion-dollar business.

Clay remained a public servant in private life. During the Korean War President Truman asked Clay to oversee the newly formed Defense Production Agency. He was a major force behind the Crusade for Freedom and the establishment of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty. He organized New York's Civil Defense efforts at the request of Governor Dewey. He was instrumental in getting Eisenhower to resign from the Army so that he could run for President in 1952. Clay worked the entire campaign for Eisenhower. After the election he was a central figure in picking the new cabinet. At President

Eisenhower's request he led the effort to design the Interstate Highway System and used his influence to get the legislation through Congress.[30]

In 1961, Berlin was back in the news: the Berlin Wall was erected. President Kennedy asked Clay to go to Berlin as his special emissary with the rank of ambassador. Clay's presence there had a calming effect on the Germans and provided Kennedy with an intrepid advisor. Clay urged Kennedy to reinforce the garrison in Berlin, and a task force was dispatched by autobahn through East Germany to the beleaguered city. Clay's most talked about action during his nine months in the walled city was his ordering tanks to Checkpoint Charlie when the East Germany guards had unlawfully stopped an American official. Clay knew the Soviets were attempting to portray the Berlin Wall as an East German initiative. The Soviets responded by positioning tanks across the checkpoint from the American tanks. Clay had punctured the myth of East German sovereignty over East Berlin. Clay left Berlin in May 1962, as the immediate crisis had passed and the U.S. commitment was reconfirmed.

Clay resigned from Continental Can in 1962. From 1963 to 1973 he was the senior partner in Lehman Brothers, a Wall Street firm. He continued to perform myriad public service jobs and stayed active in the Republican National Committee. He was the consummate fund raiser having raised over \$750 million dollars for various charities and worthy organizations.

Part III

Analysis

Clay as a Strategic Leader

This brief resume cannot do justice to a leader who spent 31 years as a soldier, who was an advisor to three Presidents, who served for 23 years at the highest levels of business, and who is called the father of the Federal Republic of Germany. It does, however, amply underscore the assertion that he was a strategic leader.

DA Pam 600-80 states that strategic leaders must be able to create, establish, and build organizations in order to reduce chaos and complexity. Clay did so from a standing start first as Chief of Materiel, Army Service Forces, then as the Deputy for Military Government, and again as the first CINCEUR.

In each of these assignments Clay operated in an environment of near total chaos. The old organizations were inadequate for the complexity of the tasks at hand. Each position required Clay to understand the other complex organizations that impacted on his and to construct relationships that would be productive. As Chief of Materiel he had to not only anticipate the needs of a yet-to-be-sized or modernized Army and Air Force, but he also had to understand the Congress, industry, the competing demands of other services, and the needs of nations from China to Europe who participated in Lend-Lease.

As Chief of the Military Government and as CINCEUR, Clay had to be able to coordinate the objectives and operations of his own organization with the allies, with the State and War Departments, with

the requirements of the tactical forces, and the with the Germans. He had to operate in the realm of diplomacy, government, nation-building, labor, commerce, agriculture, education, industry, law, finance, as well as military.

His enormous achievements clearly mark him as a model strategic leader. If vision is vital for success at this level, an examination of Clay's vision during his four years in Germany may assist in understanding this desired strategic leadership competency.

Clay's Vision for Germany

When General Clay left Washington to run the military government he had no vision, no staff, and no instructions. Over the first few months in Europe Clay received JCS directive 1067, assessed the situation in Germany, recruited needed staff, and began to shape his organization.

The impact of the terrible destruction of Germany and the needs of the German people along with the often conflicting views of the allies over governing Germany probably sped the crystallization of Clay's vision. While Clay never specifically recorded a vision, he clearly had one and transmitted it to his organization and to all those who had an impact on its realization. This vision can be distilled from interviews with his biographer, from a series of lectures given by Clay after his retirement from military service, collected in a book entitled Germany and the Fight for Freedom, and from his papers including his book, Decision in Germany.

Concisely, Clay's vision was that Germany should be shaped into a democratic nation-state and accepted back into the family of nations as soon as possible, and that its people should be afforded the opportunity for a decent life and self-governance. He saw that it was

imperative for the free world and for the long term security and prosperity of Europe that a democratic German state must fill the void in central Europe.

This vision was a product of Clay's values, knowledge, and experiences. His biographer, Jean E. Smith, wrote

Dealing with an occupied country required a keen sense of history. It demanded an acute awareness of the needs, aspirations, and the desires of a conquered people. Clay more than provided the political sensitivity FDR and Stimson had been looking for in Germany. He combined it with an obstinacy that was remarkably unaffected by pressure from the State and War departments to take actions that he believed would be detrimental to long-term American interests. In that respect Clay in Germany and MacArthur in Japan were similar. Both had enormous confidence in the correctness of their own on-the-spot judgment and would not tolerate second-guessing by distant headquarters.[31]

Clay had grown up in Georgia during the aftermath of Reconstruction and was undoubtedly compelled not to create the deep and longlasting resentment in Germany that American southerners felt about occupation policies. He fought to govern Germany with firmness, fairness, and compassion. While he pursued de-nazification and war crimes trials, he also protected the art treasures and patent rights of the German people and avoided the imposition of unfair reparations.

He had been moved by the poverty in America during the Great Depression. He knew that the American people had been relatively untouched by the horrors of Nazi war crimes and the destruction of war and would not favor a cruel occupation. He believed that Americans were not a vindictive people. This compelled Clay to endeavor to feed, cloth, and house the German people and the masses of displaced persons in his zone. To get them back on their feet, he had to instill in them a sense of hope for the future.

He certainly understood that Germany dominated central Europe geographically. It was situated between the potentially ambitious, certainly vindictive, communist USSR and the physically and morally weakened western European democracies of France, Britain, and the Benelux. He knew that military government was temporary and that when it ended, if a democratic state had not been created in Germany, then a communist or fascist one would once more arise.

He understood that the seeds of World War II were sown at the Treaty of Versailles which weakened Germany by fragmenting the German nation. He was driven to maintain a German state that represented to the fullest extent possible the German nation. Further, he understood that to care for itself and eventually take its place in the family of nations, Germany must be allowed to have industry, commerce, and agriculture as a free market economy might dictate.

While noble, this vision was certainly not shared initially by many significant others with whom Clay had to work. From the allies who had suffered directly from the Nazi actions to the American people who had been rallied to destroy the "evil Hun", the mood was clearly punitive. Germany was to be occupied, punished for its sins and aggression, and never allowed to gain such power again. Clay reported that he had to deal with

a tremendous amount of understandable bitterness and hatred that failed to, or wouldn't, recognize that you couldn't have an empty void in the center of Europe, and any efforts that you made to fill that void you knew you were going to be met with tremendous criticism and resentment. Even Washington didn't really know what it wanted.[32]

Fortunately, as Clay's vision developed he was in agreement with several powerful personalities such as his boss General Eisenhower and

Secretary of State Byrnes.

Clay had to work hard to inspire others within his organization to understand his direction and vision for Germany. Clay stated early on that it was his job to "run Germany not ruin it." [33] He found that "one of the hardest things you have to face in an occupation situation: your own staff are zealots... for reforms that go far beyond anything that's ever been done in your own country." [34] For example, after reestablishing the German press, Clay was the subject of a critical article. His information bureau curtailed that issue of the newspaper. Clay revoked his staff's directive because the greater issue to him was demonstrating by example what freedom of the press meant.

As the tensions between the U.S.-led West block and the Soviet-dominated East block grew into reality in places like Turkey and Greece, the chances of realizing Clay's carefully crafted vision for a unified, democratic Germany also faded. Soviet cooperation in the quadripartite control council began to wane, eventually driving the French into the U.S.-British camp. As the western allies proceeded with political, economic, and financial reforms and included Germany in the Marshall Plan the Soviets resorted to confrontation.

Clay's unilateral initiation of the Berlin airlift as the Soviets closed the border is probably his ultimate act to fulfill his vision. It convinced Germany and Europe that the United States was committed to their security. It bolstered tottering governments in France and Italy that were under heavy pressure from strong internal communist parties. It also terminated in all but name the quadripartite control for all but the city of Berlin. Without the commitment the airlift represented it is doubtful that the German Basic Law would have been

enacted on that NATO would have come into being.

While Clay spent much time building, shaping and guiding his organization to govern Germany, as a strategic leader he spent the majority of his time and effort shaping the external environment to prevent the destruction of the future he envisioned. Over the course of his four years in Germany, he resigned, or threatened to, eleven times as policies and decisions were made or proposed by others that put his vision at risk. Clay did not foresee what would happen; he was not a mystic. He did envision what could and should happen; he saw the possible futures and fought to keep on track toward the best of those possibilities. Unlike the vision described in popular literature, Clay's vision did not primarily focus internally on his organization; it looked externally on the broader, more fundamental mission to reshape and rebuild Germany, providing his organization, the US government, and the entire coalition both direction and inspiration.

Developing the Capacity to have Vision

A key question of this study is how one develops the ability or mental capacity to perform the tasks of strategic leadership, especially the capability for strategic vision.

Some will argue that leaders are born and not made; that they start life with an amount of intellectual potential that is the primary determinate of how intellectually capable they become. (That Clay was a descendant of Senator Henry Clay, the son of a US senator, and father of two sons, both general officers, make this position tempting in Clay's case. No causal inference can be drawn, however, from this data alone.)

Others argue that leaders are made or developed and that

development is the result of experiences including work, training, and education.

In research sponsored by the Army Research Institute for the Behavioral Sciences, Dr. T. Owen Jacobs and his associates concluded that leaders develop across bands or modes. This theory represents a combination of the "inbred" and "developmental" schools. It recognizes development within a range determined by the individual's potential. Development occurs as leaders acquire frames of reference that are increasingly broad and complex. Their research indicates that development of strategic leaders was enhanced by certain types of experiences. In addition to education and work in units, they cited instructor duty and "full stretch" assignments as key. Full stretch assignments are those especially challenging jobs which cause one to work at full potential. They can entail duties that normally call for an officer of higher grade and level of anticipated cognitive complexity or involve working in new and complex environments, perhaps serving directly for a strategic leader. Through these stretching assignments one's frames of reference or mental maps develop at an accelerated pace.[35]

The Development of General Clay

Clay's career path was unique for his day and would be viewed as totally non-standard in today's Army, even considering the non-traditional careers of such notables as Alexander Haig, Max Thurman, and Colin Powell.

Clay had limited formal education: three years at the United States Military Academy. He only attended the equivalent of his branch basic and advanced courses; this company grade schooling was pro forma in Clay's case as he had instructed in both courses before

attending as a student. One cannot imagine that they were mind stretching educational opportunities. Clay may be the only four star general of this century to have never attended a staff or war college.

Clay did serve about seven years as an instructor at his branch school, at Auburn, and at West Point. While the old saying that the teacher learns more than the student may be true, these experiences focused Clay on familiar subjects at the undergraduate and junior officer level. The degree to which these duties may have expanded his frames of reference appear questionable.

Clay's lack of time in troop units and lack of command assignments are shocking by today's standards. He only served two years with troops during which time he had his only command, an engineer company. Interestingly, Clay showed great aptitude for duty with troops: his command efficiency report, written by a Colonel, veteran of World War I, stated that Clay was "A born commander. Of some three hundred or more company commanders I have known, I know none his superior...I have never seen his better." [36]

What Clay did experience were full stretch assignments. From his posting to Washington in 1933 he began a series of very demanding jobs that stretched and expanded his frames of references. In Clay's words,

I've been very fortunate in that for many, many years I've had responsibilities of substantial magnitude. When I was a lieutenant in the Chief of Engineers' office on the Rivers and Harbors desk, we were dealing with \$400-500 million a year. And while I had none of the legal responsibility, I had much of the actual responsibility. I have really never worked for anybody that didn't let me take all of the responsibility that I would take. [37]

Clay had numerous, challenging assignments as an engineer which

gave him an orientation toward futuristic thinking. Mapping, conducting hydroelectric surveys, designing and building locks and dams, and studying the impact of these waterway projects all were mentally stimulating and demanding activities. The Denison Dam was a massive undertaking. Besides the engineering, architectural, logistical, and construction tasks, Clax had to envision numerous other aspects of this project including the impact on the region, its ecology, its commerce and agriculture, and others.

During his assignment to the Rivers and Harbors section he not only had responsibility for project design, impact, and finance, but he also experienced phenomenal expansion of his frames of reference. He learned about politics, how the U.S. government and its Congress operated. He participated in Roosevelt's vision to put America back on its feet through his involvement with New Deal programs such as the Civilian Conservation Corps. This political awareness was crucial to Clax when he was framing his vision and then arduously attempting to protect it. He had the knowledge and the experience to toggle the right switches in the executive and legislative branches of government to keep his vision alive and accomplishable.

His work to expand America's network of airports and to negotiate with the government of Brazil continued his string of complex, challenging, and developmental jobs. The stretching nature of his demanding duties as the Chief of Materiel in World War II have already been amply detailed.

Clax undoubtedly also grew from his exposure to other senior and strategic leaders from many different sectors. His assignments in Washington put him in contact with congressmen, general officers like Marshall, and with other significant public servants like Harry

Hopkins, James Byrnes, and Henry Morgenthau. Clay had to grow to understand how they thought and how they acquired and interpreted information in order to successfully work with them on their level. His service under Eisenhower and MacArthur were similarly developmental.

Lastly, Clay continued to develop frames of reference as a strategic leader. His relative lack of experience with European allies (His work with Lend Lease was his only previous exposure of any significance.) was overcome quickly as he was immersed into quadripartite control of Germany. His ability to understand the varied positions of the British, French, Soviets, and the Germans themselves, was critical to his vision and his success in protecting it.

Clearly, Clay entered public life with immense intellectual potential as his standing at West Point attests. What he lacked in higher educational opportunities he made up for through self-development and through his experiences as an instructor. Most importantly, Clay experienced a series of demanding duties which pushed his development to the limit. These full stretch assignments maximized his growth potential for fifteen years prior to his becoming a strategic leader. They appear to be the primary reason that Clay was able to concoct, implement, and protect his rather controversial vision as successfully as he did.

Part IV
Implications for the U.S. Army

From this case study of a very successful strategic leader several lessons emerge that the Army should apply in its endeavor to ensure that leaders with necessary skills are available to meet the needs of the Army and the nation, especially at the strategic level.

First, the review of Army leadership doctrine indicates the lack of a clearly articulated doctrinal framework. Inconsistencies in terminology and the uneven handling of the demands of leadership at various levels are but two examples which demonstrate that revision is required. The DCSPER should establish a leadership doctrinal framework with the publication of an appropriate regulation. That regulation should recognize the three distinguishable levels of leadership identified in this report as direct, senior, and strategic. The regulation should clearly define responsibilities for further doctrinal work and research needed in this area. DA Pam 600-80 provides a good starting point for this leadership framework, especially given the well-reasoned critique by retired Lieutenant General Ulmer which appeared in Parameters.

Second, recognizing that these three levels of leadership are distinguishable because of the significantly different demands on leaders, the DCSPER should review current policies and procedures for leader recruitment, development, assignment and evaluation. An important first step in this review should be an update of the work ARI has done to describe the nature of work for leaders at each level. A suggested thesis question for this review is "Do the Army's

personnel policies and procedures ensure that officers with the highest potential for leadership are selected, retained, developed and available for assignment across the full spectrum of the Army's leadership requirements?" An example concern was raised by an Army strategic leader during the Army War College Strategic Leadership Conference in March, 1991. He acknowledged that the nature of work was vastly different as an officer moves from lower levels, like battalion command, to eventually serve as a general officers, even as strategic leaders. He found it incongruent, then, that all officers are evaluated on the same efficiency report format. Can one OER best measure potential for direct and for strategic leadership?

Third, this research indicates that to accomplish tasks such as envisioning, future strategic leaders must have the potential for complex intellectual activity. Researchers like T. Owen Jacobs and Elliott Jaques report that the potential for this kind of cognitive work can be measured and predicted in young adults. They have used an instrument called the Career Path Appreciation (CPA) to measure what they call cognitive complexity.[38] The DCSPER should give serious consideration to the use of this or other tools to assist in identification of potential senior and strategic leaders as early as the advanced course with follow-up at staff and senior service colleges. These instruments could be used as part of the process to select officers to attend the School of Advanced Military Studies at Fort Leavenworth. Subsequent assignments for officers identified as having extremely high potential for success as strategic leadership levels could be tailored and managed to provide the full stretch experiences that research and the Clay study indicate are critical.

Fourth, Clay's example seems to suggest that experience is far

more important than education. This may be true only for those like Clay who are self-developers with exceptional intellectual talent. It does seem obvious that properly designed educational programs can be stretching experiences, too. The methods employed by each staff and senior service college should be reviewed to ensure that they are designed to accomplish that objective. For example, one could challenge the methods currently used at the Army War College as best to stretch colonels intellectually for future work as strategic leaders. The War College experience should entail less analysis and more integration and synthesis. It should include individual and group study projects that require students to deal with unanswerable questions, to transform chaos into order, and to strive to make the complex relatively simple. The War College regime should cause students to experience the type of intellectual activities that are demanded of strategic leaders.

Fifth, this research indicates that strategic leaders must be creative and innovative. Potential strategic leaders like Clay do not always shine as lieutenants because young officers serve in an environment of conformity, rules, norms, regulations, and traditions. Clay was referred to as "bolshhevistic" in an early efficiency report, a comment the likes of which would end a lieutenant's career today. Clay and others of the inter-war era survived their lieutenancy because the promotion system was based on seniority not performance. Today's exceptional, and creatively inclined, junior officer may be eliminated for the type of unexceptional performance that Clay rendered in his first ten years of service. Increasing the sensitivity and awareness of the officer corps to this situation could be accomplished through the earlier use of instruments like the Meyer

Briggs Type Indicator.

Sixth, this study of General Clay clearly suggests that officers who experience non-standard career patterns may still develop into strategic leaders. Clay was a master of the bureaucratic process and a superb administrator, but he never had an opportunity to demonstrate tactical or warfighting prowess. With the current emphasis on the warrior ethic, he might be passed over in today's Army. Critical to Clay's development were the series of demanding, full stretch assignments. It is interesting to note that while the Army uses the "best qualified to meet the needs of the Army" method of selecting officers for schools, promotions, and commands, it does recognize that some who are best qualified to serve at the next level may not have followed a standard career path. In his 1990 instructions to the colonel selection board Secretary of the Army Stone gave the board a special charge not to "forget the rare and exceptional officer who may not 'fit the mold'... but whose talents and contributions mark him or her for future service... for the good of the Army." [39] The Secretary's charge to boards is prudent, but it needs more emphasis. The DCSPER should track the success of boards in meeting this guidance.

Seventh, this study demonstrates that strategic leaders must understand the political realm. Clay is a perfect example of the apolitical soldier who was nonetheless politically savvy. Like Clay, strategic leaders must be able to interact with and successfully influence national political leaders. They must not only know the players and how they think but also understand the processes and resultant products. War is fundamentally a political act, thus, the Army must ensure that its future strategic leaders have the

preparatory assignments that will make them politically smart and capable. As Colonel A. J. Bacevich wrote in the December 1990 Parameters, the "exclusion of soldiers from politics does not guarantee peace. It only guarantees that those who command armies in wartime will be politically obtuse." [40]

Eighth, the Clay model provides insights about strategic vision. His vision for post-war Germany provided his organization, the U.S. government, and the allies a clear but contentious prescription for action. His single greatest challenge, and achievement, was preventing the actions of internal and external agents from destroying the vitality of his noble vision. His ability to create and protect his vision were products of his exceptional intellectual potential which was developed over a lifetime of diverse, demanding assignments. The DCSPER should include strategic vision in the leadership doctrinal framework that this study recommends. The Army War College should continue to encourage research on this subject and include strategic vision in the agenda of future Strategic Leadership Conferences.

Lastly, the study of unique leaders like General Clay enrich our understanding of the topical issues of strategic leadership and vision. Clay and probably others with non-standard careers have been overlooked. Perhaps he appears to the warriors as the epitome of the bureaucrat/administrator type who would manage not lead the Army. That he is not studied among the "Great Captains" is understandable. That he is not studied as a highly successful strategic leader is unfortunate and unwise. Frankly, his contributions were lasting, monumental, visionary, and strategic. If the United States Army War College is to be the Army's Center for Strategic Thought, perhaps students should get less of Rommel and more of Clay.

ENDNOTES

1. Department of the Army, FM 100-5, Operations, May 1986, pp. 13-14.
2. Department of the Army, FM 22-103, Leadership and Command at Senior Levels, 21 June 1987, p. 1.
3. The idea that task demands on leaders at the highest levels of complex organizations require superior cognitive ability can be seen in the work Elliott Jaques, T. Owen Jacobs and their associates. These concepts are captured in Stratified Systems Theory. See "The Development of Intellectual Capacity, A Discussion of Stratified Systems Theory," The Journal of Applied Behavioral Sciences, 22:4, 1986, pp 361-383. Dr. T. Owen Jacobs of the Army Research Institute for the Behavioral Sciences worked with Jaques on a study (ARI Research Report 1420) entitled Senior Level Performance Requirements at the Executive Level which finds that cognitive requirements are greater for leaders as they ascend the organizational structure. Dr. Jacobs is the primary author of DA Pam 600-80 which reflects the results of this research. Dr. Jacobs repeated these findings at the Strategic Leadership Conference, Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, March 1991.
4. Clausewitz, On War, p. 100.
5. Ibid., p. 112.
6. Department of the Army, FM 22-103, Leadership and Command at Senior Levels, 21 June 1987, p. 7.
7. Department of the Army, DA Pam 600-80, Executive Leadership, 19 June 1987, p. 6.
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9. Walter F. Ulmer, Jr., "The Army's New Senior Leadership Doctrine," Parameters, Dec 87, pp 10-17.
10. Thomas J. Peters, Thriving on Chaos, p. 482.
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12. Ibid., p. 97.
13. John W. Gardner, On Leadership, pp 130-1.
14. Burt Nanus, "Futures-Creative Leadership," The Futurist, May-June 1990, p. 14.

15. Warren Bennis and Burt Nanus, Leaders, the Strategies for Taking Charge, pp. 87-109.
16. Ibid., p. 89.
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